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Far beyond the problem of the quantity of money, false money appears as the 
general common issue in monetary debates that occurred in European countries in the 
16th and 17th centuries. It first referred to sovereignty, in a time of state-building, as well 
as to a serious economic problem. Beyond sovereignty and economy, justice and the public 
faith were endangered by those who devoted themselves to falsify the currency. Yet, the 
thesis of this paper is that one cannot understand clearly the general topic of false money 
in the early modern period by reading texts of that time with today's general definition of 
false money. The variety of falsifications and their links appear especially when carefully 
reading the monetary discourses of Jean Bodin, Juan de Mariana and John Locke. These 
authors developed major arguments about the limits of political powers, elements which 
innerved their visions of currency management. A general claim to counteract 
counterfeiting (as implemented by individuals) may conceal a claim to suppress any 
possibility of debasing, and even enhancing, currency (as decided by princes). Making 
clearer monetary discourses on that topic and establishing a hierarchy between those 
dimensions help understand why the false money issue was firstly considered a matter of 
monetary justice by the prince himself. We propose, then, to identify the multiple 
dimensions of false money: counterfeiting, degradation of coins, debasement and 
enhancement; while some are the result of individuals, others are princes’ decisions. Until 
the end of the 17th century, monetary instability impeded the development of production 
on the long run. Stabilizations, through a monetary revolution close to what had been 
proposed by Bodin, Mariana and Locke, occurred between the end of the 17th and the 





Bodin, Mariana and Locke on false money as a 
multidimensional issue 1 
1. Introducing the problem 
In the beginning of the fourteenth century, the Florentine poet Dante Alighieri 
penned a famous allusion to his contemporary, the French king Philip IV the Fair, in his 
Divina Commedia:  
“There shall be seen the woe that on the Seine  
He brings by falsifying of the coin,  
Who by the blow of a wild boar shall die” (Dante Alighieri, 1867, canto 
XIX, v.118-120) 2.   
Dante suggested that Philip’s death following an accident was only justice after the 
falsifications of his reign (1285-1314). In 1301, he had already been accused of falsifying 
coins by an enemy of his, the bishop Bernard Saisset, who contested his authority. The 
infamy of being a “falsificatore di moneta”, as this was often repeated in subsequent 
centuries, pursued the memory of the king and constituted a historical and moral 
background for many authors dealing with money. Around 1600, for example, the French 
publicist Jean Bodin (1593, VI/3:118 ) and the Spanish Jesuit Juan de Mariana (1609, 
chapter 10) recalled the infamous history of this king by way of Dante’s judgement. 
Mariana emphasised the momentary victory of morality when Philip,  
“at his death, repented his deed and told his son, Louis Hutin, that he had 
to put up with his people’s hatred because he had debased the coinage, and 
that Louis Hutin, therefore, was to correct his father’s mistakes and hearken 
back to old reckonings” (Mariana, 1609, chapter 10).  
Several decades after Bodin and Mariana, Samuel Pepys, who authored an 
important diary of the 1660s in England, related a case of counterfeit coins that seems 
strange to today’s readers. Visiting the Tower (the Mint), he was told the story:  
“of one that got a way of coining money as good and passable and large as the true 
money is, and yet saved 50 per cent to himself; which was by getting moulds made 
to stamp groats like old groats, which is done so well that there is no better in the 
world; and is as good, nay better, then those commonly go; which was the only 
thing that they could find out to doubt them by […] and then coming to the 
Controller of the Mint, he could not, I say, find any other thing to raise any doubt 
                                                            
1 We thank the anonymous referees for their very helpful comments. 
2 “Lì si vedrà il duol che sovra Senna / induce, falseggiando la moneta, / quel che morrà di colpo di 
cotenna.”.  
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upon, but only their being so truly round or near it.” (Pepys, May 19, 1663, T.IV: 
143-144) 
Counterfeiters may thus issue better coins than the Mints, when the currency is of 
bad quality! 3 In this case, the Master of the Mint, recognising his inability to preserve a 
quality currency, avoided punishing the counterfeiter:  
“He was neither hanged nor burned, the cheat was thought so ingenious and being 
the first time they could ever trap him in it, and so little hurt to any man in it, the 
money being as good as commonly goes”. (Pepys, id) 4 
 
Both cases of Philip the Fair and Pepys’ counterfeiter spread confusion as to what 
should be considered false money. On one hand, the legitimate sovereign Philip IV The 
Fair was by no means a counterfeiter, as would have been an individual usurping the 
sovereign’s right to mint coins. He simply used, and maybe abused, two of the basic 
monetary policy tools of his time: changing the legal value of coins5 and issuing new coins 
of a lower metallic content. On the other hand, it is clear that Pepys’ counterfeiter usurped 
the sovereign’s mark, like any other counterfeiter, whether he moulded coins of good or 
bad quality. While Philip IV seemed to have sovereign legitimacy in deciding the 
characteristics of the currency, he was explicitly considered a counterfeiter by Saisset and 
Dante; Pepys’ counterfeiter on the other hand should have been sentenced to death 
because he usurped the sovereign’s mark, and yet he was almost considered virtuous!  
These two paradoxes raise a major question: beyond the two cases related above, 
how can we understand the diversity of the false money issues without restricting it to a 
counterfeiting problem, which obviously refers to crime? False money is more generally 
related to justice issues, in terms of criminality or not, and it is necessary to distinguish 
forms of unfairness induced by specific falsifications. False money is also related to 
legitimacy issues, so that one can consider the binary criteria true / false as depending on 
the legitimacy of the issuer’s authority.  
In this paper, we would like to clarify some issues about metallic currency 
falsifications mainly before the 18th century. This subject, previously neglected, deserves a 
renewed attention in economic literature (see for example Caffentzis, 1989 and 2007; 
Sargent and Velde, 2003; Wennerlind, 2004; Schnabel and Shin, 2006; Valenze, 2006). We 
will not deal with the case of the forging of notes, that appeared mostly after that period6. 
We will adopt a broad definition of false money, which seems to have originated with 
                                                            
3 Pamuk (2000) observes this paradox concerning the Ottoman Empire.  
4 The counterfeiter’s gain was due to the discrepancy already existing between the legal value and the metallic 
content of the degraded circulating coins. If one Crown should officially contain 1,25 oz. of silver, since there 
was a general clipping, the counterfeiter could -for example- produce two Crowns with this quantity of silver.  
5 For example, he cried up the silver groat from 13 to 39 deniers between 1290 and 1303. 
6 As explained by Nussbaum (1950: 493), forgery was facilitated “in the era of paper money as mass 
falsification became easier, less expensive and more remunerative”.  
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individuals as well as political powers in parts of Europe. Then, a general claim to 
counteract counterfeiting may conceal a claim to suppress any possibility of debasing the 
currency. The false money problem was not only technical, but also -and maybe especially- 
political. In order to understand this point, we aim at making monetary discourse clearer 
on the topic of falsifications, by analysing how three distinct authors mobilized specific 
theoretical grounds in order to solve this problem: the French Jean Bodin (1530-1596), the 
Spanish Jesuit Juan de Mariana (1536-1624), and the English John Locke (1632-1704). 
These three authors tried to define the rules of a fair government, defining the extent and 
limits of the political powers of their day, with Locke extending his reflection to the 
people’s right to resist and Mariana even legitimizing tyrannicide. We would like to 
emphasize that, in the realm of monetary ideas, Bodin, Mariana and Locke had also some 
strong connections: as for them, the monetary power had to be restrained and, in order to 
protect the society against its excesses, boundaries had to be clearly defined. For these 
authors, the false money issue was above all a matter of justice. By the establishment of a 
hierarchy between distinct categories of false money, we will provide a relevant analytic 
framework that helps understand their arguments. 
This paper states that one cannot understand clearly the general topic of false 
money if old texts are read with today’s general definition of false money. A conceptual 
framework embracing diverse forms of falsification appears to be the basis for a clear 
assessment of primary sources and debates of the time. In section 2, we identify two 
primary categories of false money: the concept refers to counterfeiting –strictly speaking- 
(by individuals) and to degradation of coins (by individuals, moneyers and officers of the 
Mint). In spite of repressive rules, condemnations of private counterfeiters were, for a long 
time, quite rare, and executing the punishment remained hypothetical. In the same time, 
money is not only a collection of objects, but an institution based on the trust the members 
of a society invest in it, as emphasized in section 3. In the discourses aimed at fighting 
counterfeiting by individuals, the issue was also (and sometimes especially) to counteract 
monetary manipulation. Hence, we deal with debasement and enhancement (by princes) as 
broader categories of false money. Then, we summarize the analysis by proposing a general 
scheme of false money. The symbolic and political dimensions of money are crucial for its 
acceptance, but what we could call “public faith” (following Bodin and Locke), that makes 
money unanimously accepted within a community, can sometimes collapse when a crisis 
arises. In section 4, we try to explain why the diverse forms of false money in broader 
sense may threaten the social significance of money (Wennerlind, 2004:131). We present a 
few monetary crises in Europe directly linked to the falsification problem, centring on 
three cases wherein three major authors exercised their pens: in France, a spiral of 
enhancement following rises in the voluntary price of the gold écu (Bodin); in Castile, the 
crisis of pure and debased copper coins, the vellón (Mariana); in England, the crisis in the 
quality of coins and the intense controversy surrounding the reform of the currency 
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(Locke). The problem of money quantity was subordinated to that of money quality. 
Eventually, in section 5, we conclude on the ‘monetary revolution’ that led to a greater 
stability of the metallic monetary system. Until the end of the 17th century, monetary 
instability and, consequently, mistrust of the currency, impeded the development of 
production on the long run, as understood by these three great authors. A stable monetary 
system was a requirement to a sound system of credit, being itself a condition to the 
spreading of industrial capitalism. Eventually, stabilizations, through a monetary revolution 
close to what had been proposed by Bodin, Mariana and Locke, occurred between the end 
of the 17th and the beginning of the 18th century. 
2. False money in a narrow sense 
Bodin, Mariana and Locke showed a common concern about the ability to debase 
the currency that led them to strongly affirm the necessity of a metallic system able to 
prevent any form of false money, be they operated by individuals or princes. There was 
then clearly a strong connection between falsification by individuals and falsification by 
princes and their administration. Hence, false money may take different forms that need to 
be distinguished when trying to take the complexity of this issue into account. Let us start 
with the three components of any coin, each one being opened to possible manipulation: 
an official coin under the metallic monetary system of the early modern period is made of a 
piece of metal, the mark of the sovereign, and a legal value expressed in the official unit of 
account. What will be considered “false money” in this text is an unfair manipulation of a 
combination of these three components, be it by individuals or princes themselves: raising 
the legal value, lowering the metallic content, counterfeiting the sovereign’s mark. 
Divergent opinions on the borderline between fair and unfair manipulation can be readily 
found during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries; this divergence is at the root of the 
ambiguity of the false money issue.  
However, false money in a narrow sense, closer to the current representation, finds 
its expression in two operations whose definition and consequences call for further 
explanation: counterfeiting and degradation. Yet, starting with the idea of usurping a 
symbol, false money is extended toward situations of bad money, or coins of inferior 
quality.  
2.1. Counterfeiting 
When speaking today about false money, forgery, or counterfeiting, is what first 
comes to mind. Under the metallic monetary system of the early modern Europe, 
counterfeiting affected coins. Counterfeit coins were produced by individuals, 
organisations or princes not authorised by the sovereign Prince, whatever the quality of 
these coins. Consequently, the main distinctive feature of these coins was an usurpation of 
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the sovereign’s issuing rights, leading to a counterfeit of the sovereign’s mark. 
Counterfeiters directly menaced the issuing privileges granted or acknowledged by the 
prince (acting for “the common good”). 
In that sense, counterfeiting was mostly operated by individuals seeking a profit by 
means of the gap between the current value of genuine coins and the output cost of 
counterfeits. Thus, beside the usurpation of the sovereign’s mark, one can identify three 
other characteristics of forged currency: a disconnection between the legal value of the 
coin and the value of its metallic content, a lowered metallic content (obtained either by a 
lesser fineness of precious metals because light coins would be too easily identified, or by 
resorting to cores made of copper or bronze and plated), and a disconnection between the 
legal metallic content of the coin and its actual one.  
The dynamics of counterfeiting could be related to that of debasement, as stresses 
Pamuk (2000) on the Ottoman case: forging new coins is an opportunity to make a profit, 
because of the temporary gap between the implicit value of metal given by the legal value 
of newly debased coins and the commercial value of that metal. Individuals rarely operated 
alone; organised networks were frequent, and they often operated from a foreign base. In 
Russia, for example, “the known techniques were numerous. Some produced stamps, 
others produced copper coins which were later coated with silver. Some even mixed tin or 
copper with silver right at the mint. Coins imitating the Russian coins were produced 
abroad, as well in early 18th century such money was produced by the Danes, Swedes, and 
perhaps the English” (Raskov, 2007:13). 
There were cases of counterfeiting by princes themselves, local or foreign. This 
must be distinguished from the tactics by which princes aimed at appropriating the quality 
and success of foreign coins by issuing their own coins featuring their own marks but 
replicating the metallic characteristics of a well-known and widely-used international coin: 
see the cases of local replications of the florin or the ducat in the later Middle Ages and the 
beginning of the early modern period (Nussbaum, 1950: 317). The case of kings ordering 
the issue of counterfeit foreign coins, thus seeking to destabilise the foreign state, seem to 
be rare in history. Late feudal lords seeking resources, in the context of a general lack of 
currency and sometimes of political unrest, came to issue coins directly imitating those of 
the king. Some produced coins inferior to royal ones, while others minted coins of good 
quality, but were nevertheless considered as counterfeiters by the king (see Bodin 1593, 
vol. I: 332-3, featuring such a case). At the same time, local monetary workshops minted 
exact replications of royal coins without being authorised to do so, thus collecting an 
undue seigniorage to the detriment of the king’s Mint.  
2.2. Degradation 
Degradation, or any kind of abrasion, leads to coins of lesser quality because of the 
resulting decrease in their weight. The main consequence of degradation, and, when 
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voluntary, its main purpose, are a gap between the actual metallic content of the coin and 
its legal content, as ordered by edicts. It thus contributes to the lowering of the metallic 
content, and to the disconnection between the legal value of the coin and the value of its 
metallic content. Degradation resulted from inevitable wear and tear of coins in their daily 
use, a situation which obviously did not involve fraudulent manipulation. But this 
involuntary and collective degradation produced a form of false money as well as voluntary 
degradation, that were clearly unfair.  
Individuals degraded coins in order to collect the metal and, consequently, either 
bring it to the Mint (and get coins corresponding to the weight of the metal, minus the 
possible brassage and seigniorage), or sell it, or mint counterfeit coins by themselves. With 
this borderline case, one can see that degradation may be oriented toward the first case of 
false money seen above, and this was obviously serious enough to consider voluntary 
degradation a major crime. It took different forms: writers of the period often precisely 
detailed the modalities of degradation, including clipping, that appears today as the most 
prominent modality. Sargent and Velde feature sweating, clipping and shaving: “Sweating is 
an artificial form of abrasion in which the losses are collected, while clipping and shaving 
are outright removal of pieces of metal from the edges of the coin” (Sargent and Velde, 
2002:346). Nussbaum talks about “’clipping’, ‘washing’ and other ways of ‘lightening’ 
genuine coins”, as “more refined offenses” than “outright counterfeiting” (Nussbaum, 
1950:40).  
Whatever the modalities, and whatever their voluntary nature, degradation was 
sometimes so common that the currency was seriously deteriorated. Sargent and Velde cite 
an estimation of the consequences of wear and tear, showing something like 0.2 to 0.3% 
per year on English silver coinage, that is, between 10 to 20% loss of weight after 30 years 
(Sargent and Velde, 2002:346). Hence, degradation had important repercussions: the bad 
state of coins frequently compelled users to specify in every transaction the currency in 
which the payment would be made. This fuelled confusion and stimulated endless disputes 
at fairs or markets. The figure 1 (below) summarizes this first step of the analysis, showing 
the articulation between counterfeiting and degradation. Falsification may occur either 
through degradation, or through counterfeiting; and the latter requires the former.  
 8 
Figure 1 – False money in a narrow sense 
 
2.3. Counterfeiting and degradation: between repression and tolerance 
One must stress the great danger induced by an uncontrolled spreading of 
counterfeiting and degradation of coins: trust in money was corroded, beginning with its 
first stage, the routine of daily uses. Clipping and counterfeiting were thus morally 
reprehensible acts, which demanded the revision of the legislation and the punishment 
system. But, whereas counterfeiting was, in principle, heavily punished, as well as voluntary 
degradation, we will record some examples of penalties, and try to explain why fraudulent 
operations were, in fact, often tolerated.  
Arguments against counterfeiting and voluntary degradation: from morals to 
repression 
Religious authorities took part in the prosecution of counterfeiters, who introduced 
suspicion and confusion into the society. In 1123, by the council of Latran, counterfeiters 
and « circulators of base coins » were declared oppressors of the poor, disturbers of the 
state and, therefore, excommunicated (in 1583, the council of Tours reiterated these 
sanctions) (Ruding, 1819, I:167). These questions were still discussed in churches at the 
end of the 17th century, as evidenced by the Sermon against clipping by William Fleetwood in 
1694 in England. For the bishop of Ely, clipping was not only illegal, but also “sinful”, “as 
being a fraud upon every person” (Ruding, 1840, II:35). His Sermon addressed the case of 
false money in a precise and detailed manner. The bishop insisted on the fact that currency 
was founded on an act of faith: “For the Publick Faith engages, that every Man receiving a 
Piece of such a Mark and Denomination, shall receive in it so much Silver, and of such a 
Fineness” (Fleetwood, 1694:8). So, the moral code condemned private money-makers, 
who deserved to be punished by heavy penalties: “Clippers are as truly Thieves and 
Robbers, as those they find upon the High-ways, or breaking up their Houses, and do as 
well deserve their Chains and Halters.” (Fleetwood, 1604:17).  
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The question of false money was not confined to morals; above all, it was a legal 
problem: “The tradition of Roman law saw the right to mint as a royal prerogative and 
treated any infringement of this regalian privilege as a form of lese majesty or high 
treason.” (Sargent and Velde, 2003:65) “In the Germanic laws the original punishment for 
counterfeiting was the loss of the right hand, a penalty also inflicted in England” 
(Nussbaum, 1950:40). By the Anglo-Saxon laws, “to this punishment, already sufficiently 
severe, the cruel policy of the Anglo-Norman Kings added loss of sight and emasculation.” 
(Ruding, 1819, I:159) Punishments became more severe with the deepening monetization 
of European societies, “when the early economic system turned more monetary and the 
effects of counterfeiting were therefore more keenly felt” (Nussbaum, 1950:41); in France, 
as early as 1347 and for a long time afterward, counterfeiters could be boiled. In 1580, the 
Coutume de Bretagne specified: “counterfeiters will be boiled, then hanged” (article 634, 
quoted by Ménard, 2004). In England, during the 17th century, counterfeiting the King’s 
coins was high treason, punishable by hanging (in the case of men) or burning (in the case 
of women). Punishments were slightly less barbarous from the Enlightenment onward, but 
death remained the major sanction (Nussbaum, 1950:42). In Russia, “Mint workers were 
made to kiss the cross, examined naked, tortured if suspected, prosecuted by means of 
pouring molten tin into their throats, punished with the severing of hands and ears, and 
with whippings. Some were even evicted from their houses and exiled to Siberia” 
(Kotoshikhin, 1859: 81, quoted by Raskov, 2007: 13).  
Wennerlind (2004) showed that monetary policy not only included the issuing of 
money and the adjustment of its quantity, but also the execution of people guilty of 
tampering with the currency, and that this dimension was not marginal, but grew at the end 
of the 17th century and during the 18th. Nevertheless, despite punishments established by 
law, there generally existed a noteworthy tolerance.  
Tolerance 
While various punishments threatened “money criminals”, they were tolerated 
within the society. Counterfeiters were often persons of a high social rank, as Parsons 
(2003b) stresses: “Counterfeiting was something of an elite crime, requiring very 
considerable skills, capital and organization. Its practitioners tended to be goldsmiths (or 
locksmiths, who had the same engraving skills and were more often underpaid), merchants, 
members of the lesser nobility, or priests. (…) It was much less socially marginal than most 
criminality”. This does not mean that they were accepted, but only tolerated to a certain 
extent.  
Tolerance was all the more evident with clipping. Whereas clippers were considered 
criminals according to the law, often, in principle, to the same degree as counterfeiters, a 
lot of people in the lower ranks of society would clip coins that were already damaged (see 
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Muldrew, 1996). Thus, traditionally, clipping was not seen as robbing other individuals, 
because everybody was involved in the degradation.  
One important reason for such tolerance is that counterfeiting “lubricated” 
circulation by introducing specie, certainly not legal and whose value was not guaranteed, 
but which served to increase an inadequate money supply: “counterfeiters proved 
themselves economic agents whose function was to supply the market, while official 
coinages were defaulting. (…) Despite efforts to repress them made by kings, the need for 
specie was too big to examine closely their origin” (Feller, 1986). In cases of monetary 
tightening, degradation could avoid some major drawbacks: in England, for example, “a 
major depression and a collapse of credit, as happened in the 1590s, was averted because 
of the extent of clipping, as the clipped coins were, of necessity, increasingly accepted at 
face value.” (Muldrew, 2001: 106) As a consequence of such needs, monetary uses were 
not confined to official coins (local and foreign). Thus the so-called Gresham’s Law, re-
invented in the 19th century7, could be interpreted in a new light: “good” and “bad” coins 
circulated, and were accepted up to a certain point, unless public faith totally vanished (see 
below). 
In England, these fraudulent operations were thus regarded as “unperceivable 
faults” until the years around 1690 and finally perceived rather positively by public opinion. 
“For the practice of clipping, pernicious as it was, did not excite in the common mind a 
detestation resembling that with which men regard murder, arson, robbery, nay, even theft. 
The injury done by the whole body of clippers to the whole society was indeed immense: 
but each particular act of clipping was a trifle.” (Macaulay, 1861, T.III: 389)  
3. Widening the scope: public faith and the false money problem 
In every society, legal punishment draws the line between legal and illegal practices, 
between what are to be considered “fair” and “unfair” acts. In the case of money, the 
situation was complex, because some illegal practices could be seen as bearable, during 
situations characterised by a currency shortage. But money is not only an object managed 
by defined authorities; it is a social medium. Thus, “counterfeiting challenged the general 
confidence in the exchangeability of money and consequently damaged the capacity of 
money to mediate exchange relations.” (Wennerlind, 2004: 131). Money embodies public 
faith, a notion that must be examined.  
 
                                                            
7 In his History of Economics published in 1896, Macleod admitted: “ […] in 1864 my friend M. Wolowski 
published the treatises of Oresme and Copernicus, by which it appeared that these great men had fully 
explained the matter 160 and 32 years respectively previous to Gresham, so that this great law, which is as 
well and firmly established as the Law of Gravitation, should be called the law of Oresme, Copernicus and 
Gresham” (Macleod, 1896:448; see also De Roover, 1949:91). 
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3.1. Trusting money: from a general framework to the case of the metallic system 
The traditional functions of money (means of payment, unit of account and store 
of wealth) cannot be carried out without trust in it (Aglietta and Orléan eds, 1998; Théret 
ed., 2007). More precisely, this general faith in money can be split into three levels, as 
featured in the following diagram (Théret, 2007).  
Figure 2 - Three levels of public faith in money 
 
- Confidence, or routine faith, characterises the fact that money is routinely 
accepted as payment because everyone expects everyone else to accept it at 
face value. Routine in payments requires that the physical characteristics of 
coins are generally accepted and let people operate their transactions 
without having any doubt over their qualities and, more generally, over 
their acceptation by others. Monetary practices could thus develop daily 
without any major threats on the acceptability of the coins.  
- Credibility, or hierarchical faith, means that money is accepted because the 
credibility of its issuers is certified by a legitimate representative of the 
payment community as a whole: today, central banks; in early modern 
Europe, Mints (Newton became director of the London Mint after the 
triumph of Lockean’s monetary proposals) or sovereign monetary 
institutions (like, in France, the Cour des monnaies, which faced the 
opposition of Malestroit and Bodin as well). Credibility especially refers to 
the coinage rules implemented by the legitimate institutions.  
- Trust, or ethical faith, ensures that money is accepted because it is created in 
accordance with the values and norms which provide the foundation of the 
community in which money is valuable. What is at stake here is a social 
recognition of the hierarchy of values established through the unit of 
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account. From a pure symbolic viewpoint, coins bear symbolic 
representations or monograms of monarchs, monarchies and other 
transcending values (like, in 1683, the virgin Mary on new Castilian silver 
coins) that featured the unity of the huge diversity of economic operations 
and actors, introducing symbols of the community’s unity into every 
monetary transaction.  
Confidence, credibility and trust are thus three levels of public faith in money, whose 
combination ensures the stability of payment systems. The transcendent values of society 
are declined through the formulation of minting rules, and in the sphere of common 
payments. 
As a basic consequence of such an approach, even metallic currencies contain a 
strong degree of fiduciarity (Andreau, Carré, Carrié et Lamouroux, 2007). In every system, 
the political, economic and legal levels need to appear coherent for each actor. Hence 
money is a pluridimensional medium, and public faith must be preserved to ensure the 
functioning of the monetary system. Operations such as recoinage or the punishment of 
counterfeiters could be seen as symbolic acts, aimed at ensuring either the refoundation or 
the permanence of the monetary system and the underlying social order8. Indeed, 
counterfeiting and degradation – but, as we are going to stress it, debasement and 
enhancement as well –, could threaten the credibility of the issuing authorities, as well as 
confidence in the daily routine of monetary practices, and trust in the overall values of the 
social order – three levels essential to every monetary system.  
A comment on routine can be added: when the money system is so confused that 
counterfeiters are able to issue better coins than Mints (as in Pepys’ case), anyone might 
accept counterfeit coins. This situation can be analysed in terms of a conventional pattern: 
“A medium of exchange – say, coin of the realm – has its special status by a convention 
among tradesmen to take it without question in return for goods and services. […] the 
inconvenience of accepting a bad medium of exchange is less than the inconvenience of 
refusing it when others take it, or of taking what one can neither use nor spend.” (Lewis, 
1969: 48) But this kind of convention can nevertheless imperil the system.  
Counterfeiting, degradation and public faith 
Routine, hierarchy and ethics do interact: a “marginal” but continuously repeated 
act can undermine the whole society. As Caffentzis remarks, “theft is a one time affair, but 
the clipper’s work introduces a continuous deepening obscurity into our reality and into 
our ideas.” (Caffentzis, 1989: 28). An act considered a “trifle”, because it only consisted of 
                                                            
8 For example, the prosecution of counterfeiters at the end of the 17th century became performances in 
which “spectators, by their viewing of the scene, became adjuncts of the state in establishing – one can even 
say coercing – respect for and compliance with the rules of the monetary system.”, Wennerlind, 2004, p.149.  
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the removal of a very small amount of metal, had huge social consequences. As it will be 
shown in the following section, Jean Bodin thought that counterfeiters perpetuated crimes 
of lese-majesté and, according to John Locke, armies of clippers were more dangerous than 
foreign battalions… 
In other words, as Macaulay noted, “For great as the aggregate of the evil was, only 
an infinitesimal part of that evil was brought home by the individual malefactor.” 
(Macaulay, 1861, T.III: 390). Addison, in his very interesting History of a Shilling of 1710, 
gave voice to a coin narrating its adventures, from the mines of Peru to the pockets of 
Londoners. The coin was eventually seized by a clipper who dismembered it: “I fell into 
the Hands of an Artist who conveyed me under Ground, and with an unmerciful Pair of 
Sheers cut off my Titles, clipped my Brims, retrenched my Shape, rubbed me to my inmost 
Ring, and, in short, so spoiled and pillaged me, that he did not leave me worth a Groat.” 
(Addison, 1710: 187). This image is very fruitful. It was not only the petty coins that were 
dismembered, but the society as a whole. For example, if clippers exercised their craft on 
the English coin named Crown, clipping this coin meant eroding the King’s representation, 
so “shaving, clipping, and filing the King’s head stamped on the coin became a highly 
symbolic decapitation.” (Wennerlind, 2004: 140). Clipping, filing or shaving coins could be 
seen not only as a fraudulent practice, but also (and above all) as a political act.  
One index of the loss of confidence could be the intensification of clipping. When 
a crisis finally developed, the enduring tolerance stopped, as suggested especially by the 
case of England at the end of the 17th century that will be briefly presented below.  
3.2. False money in a broader sense: debasement and enhancement 
There were other forms of falsification, which depended largely on the perception 
of princes’ manipulation: while the king’s arbitrage was recognised, allowing him to operate 
some manipulation of money, a subtle and changing borderline separated it from the 
purely arbitrary, a situation which generated debates and sometimes led the sovereign to be 
considered a falsifier.  
The confusion around ‘debasement’ 
The very general term ‘debasement’ is highly ambiguous, since it takes on different 
meanings, even among current economic historians. Making the position clearer, as did for 
example Gould (1970), Sargent and Velde (2003) or Fantacci (2005) involves refusal of this 
loose sense. Gould (1970) actually distinguishes three practices: a) reducing the weight of 
coins; b) reducing the degree of fineness of the gold (or silver)/alloy mix from which they 
were struck; c) tariffing the coins at a higher valuation in terms of money of account, while 
leaving their physical characteristics unchanged. According to him, ‘debasement’ strictly 
speaking corresponds to case (b), while (c) characterises ‘enhancement’. The first method, 
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(a), was simply called ‘making the coins lighter’. It must be said that, in its loosest meaning, 
‘debasement’ comes to refer to these three methods!  
This is why it is more relevant to consider cases (a) and (b) as debasement 
processes, i.e. the act of decreasing the precious metal content of the coin, as ordered by 
the prince, by minting new coins, either of lower fineness of the precious metal that 
constitutes a coin (gold or silver being mixed with a base metal, generally copper) or of 
lower weight. A clear distinction must be made between enhancement (or cry-ups, ie a rise 
in the legal value of unchanged coins9, case c) and debasement (minting new coins of lower 
metallic content10, cases a and b).  
Debasement strictly speaking 
Debasement was carried out by princes. The main purpose and consequence of 
debasement was the appearance, or more generally the development, of a gap between the 
legal value and the value of the metallic content evaluated in units of account through legal 
prices of metals. Whatever the gap, it had to be greater than the brassage (a fee charged by 
the mint operator to cover production costs, excluding the price of metal); it depended 
mainly on the seigniorage decided with the coinage. Debasements were generally carried 
out officially, the characteristics of the new coins being published, especially when old 
coins were taken out of circulation in order to melt them down and issue new coins of 
lower precious metal content.  
There were nonetheless borderline cases involving hidden debasement. Princes 
could indeed order a debasement without announcing that the newly issued coins were 
debased. This was the case of Swedish King Gustav Vasa during the 1540s (Ögren and 
Runefelt, 2010). But princes did not always control the process. For example, officers of 
the Mint sometimes committed mistakes in the application of edicts. More disturbing were 
cases of officers of the Mint, or moneyers themselves, ignoring edicts and voluntarily 
issuing coins of lesser metallic content. As well as clipping and other forms of degradation, 
hidden debasement generated a gap between the actual metallic content of coins and the 
legal one, as ordered by the royal edicts, whatever the official quality of the coins.  
Enhancement 
Enhancement was the most widely used tool of monetary policy, since, in the 
metallic monetary system of medieval and early modern Europe, where coins did not bear 
                                                            
9 Though this is of old use, Sargent and Velde (2003) prefer to use ‘cry-ups’ when referring to what we will 
call here ‘enhancement’.  
10 One can note that the definition is far from being neutral. For example, French terms referring to 
enhancements or cry-ups are frequently translated in English as debasement loosely speaking, thus inducing 
misunderstandings. Similarly, the English translation from Latin may produce some confusion (see discussion 
on Mariana, below).  
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any mention of their legal value, it was very easy to change them by an edict. Like 
debasement strictly speaking, as well as degradation and counterfeiting, enhancement 
produced a gap between the legal value and the metallic value of a coin; but it did by no 
means affect the metallic content. For this reason, the practice may appear less harmful 
and unfair than debasement, in which the intrinsic value of the coin may be heavily 
affected.  
3.3. Debasement, enhancement and Public faith  
While counterfeiting and degradation were morally and legally condemned, 
although tolerated to a certain extent, debasement and enhancement could not be legally 
condemned, since they were ordered by princes themselves. They were nonetheless 
generally morally condemned, since they undermined public faith.  
In a metallic monetary system, the pact between the prince (who can dictate the 
issuing rules, such as the relationships between the unit of account and the means of 
payment) and his subjects could be easily manipulated. It is widely known that princes were 
in the habit of devaluing the standard: in the long run, every European country 
experienced a steady depreciation of its currency. For example, Cailleux (1980) and Aglietta 
(2006) calculated that in 1789, the French livre tournois represented 3,6% of its gold value 
of 1266, while the 1793 English pound sterling amounted to 35,7% of its value in 1278.  
The steady lowering of the metal content of the circulating medium endangered 
private contracts: creditors could be concerned about the means of payment used to 
redeem debts. If the prince ordered an enhancement between the loan and its repayment, 
the creditor could receive less metal than he had lent. The problem could be worse in the 
case of the withdrawal of existing coins and the issuing of new coins of a lesser metallic 
content, but this was less frequent. In response to the risks and the confusion induced by 
such practices, grew networks of bills of exchange in Europe from the 15th century, as well 
as autonomous and transnational systems of account, as ways to erect parallel systems of 
account aimed at preserving commercial contracts from enhancement and debasement (see 
Boyer-Xambeu, Deleplace, Gillard, 1994).  
According to Robert Cotton, “The Regulating of Coin hath been left to the care of 
Princes, who are presumed to be ever the Fathers of the Common-Wealth.” (Cotton, 1626, 
in Mc Culloch, 1856: 127). But when the sovereigns manipulated “their” currencies too 
frequently, public faith was endangered, in its three monetary dimensions featured in figure 
2 above. Before developing this point below by means of the analyses of Bodin, Mariana 
and Locke, another quotation from Cotton can summarise a contemporary point of view 
on this subject: “The Measures in a Kingdom ought to be constant: It is the Justice and 
Honour of the King; for if they be altered, all Men at that instance are deceived in their 
precedent Contracts [...] for no Man knoweth then, either what he hath or what he oweth.” 
(Cotton, 1626: 138)  
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When the tolerance of coins of inferior quality was no longer bearable, situations 
could lead to important crises, and the powers had to reaffirm their authority, by new 
definitions or legal measures that tried to restore confidence, credibility and trust. Crises 
generally led to recoinages11: these operations were not only a necessity after generalised 
counterfeiting and clipping, but are to be understood in the framework of rethinking the 
quality of the official coinage. These moves towards coins of better quality were seen as 
huge operations aimed at restoring the integrity of damaged coins, whereby fire purified 
bad currencies12.  
3.4. The four categories of false money 
Figure 3 summarises the four categories of false money we previously identified. 
There is obviously a moral, as well as an economic, hierarchy among these forms. Each 
false money category is associated with a main distinctive feature — although we have to 
keep in mind that all but the counterfeit of the sovereign’s mark appear in at least two 
categories. The figure must then be read as follows: as we progress from the left to the 
right, a category of false money cumulates features of former categories and includes a new 
one. For example, the metallic content is lowered as a result of all of these manipulations 
but enhancement. On the top appear the operators of each sort of false money: either 
princes, including their monetary administration (moneyers and officers of the Mint), or 
individuals.  
Falsifications are considered more unfair as we progress toward the right, since 
they are obviously more cheating and misleading the people, losing any justification 
especially related to sovereignty. Moreover, falsifications are viewed as harmful since they 
introduce trouble into routine payments and accounts. Economic harmfulness of 
falsifications depends on the quantity of degradation and counterfeiting operated, and the 
frequency and the quantity of enhancement and debasement operated by princes.  
By all means, there is a qualitative gap between the categories related to prince’s 
manipulation and those related to individual practices. Building such a chart, gathering 
individuals’ cheating and prince’s manipulation, serves to understand the continuity and 
hierarchy between those acts, as considered by various authors of the early modern period.  
                                                            
11 Recoinages could also be implemented after a technical improvement, as the French recoinage of 1640, 
decided immediately after the implementation of the mill technique of minting, that allowed to “produce a 
fluted, unclippable edge” (Appleby, 1978: 228).  
12 In his History of a Shilling, already cited, Addison recounted the recoinage operations from the point of view 
of the coins themselves:  “[…] when every Body thought our Misfortune irretrievable, and our Case 
desperate, we were thrown into the Furnace together, and (as it often happens with Cities rising out of Fire) 
appeared with greater Beauty and Lustre than we could even boast of before.” (Addison, 1710:187). 
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Figure 3 – Four categories of false money 
 
 
4. Converging analyses from distinct maelstroms of falsification:  
Bodin, Mariana, Locke  
The monetization process of the early modern period was carried out within the 
framework of a metallic monetary system, including full-bodied coins (mainly made of 
silver, but also gold and sometimes copper, as in Sweden and Spain during some periods) 
and types of billon coins (small change whose current and legal prices could not be 
justified by their intrinsic metallic content which was very poor). Since the tools of 
monetary policies were mainly limited to manipulation of the legal values of coins, of their 
metallic content, and of the quantity of coins to be issued, every part of Europe faced false 
money problems, whatever their nature. Actually, the false money problem was not only 
technical (a matter of minting techniques); it was economical (a matter of economic 
troubles), moral (a matter or fairness and justice) and eventually political (a matter of 
sovereignty). Moreover, contrary to the position frequently held in historiography, most 
debates concerned not so much the quantity of coins as their quality. This is reflected in 
the numerous publications and controversies dealing with this problem.  
Putting aside various interesting cases of monetary crises where falsifications played 
a major role, as, for example, the Kipper- und Wipper Zeit in the Holy Roman Empire (see 
for example Kindleberger, 1991), we will emphasise three examples linked with three major 
authors of their time whose writings were related to the falsification context (broadly 
speaking, as defined earlier in this paper): France, with Bodin’s writings; Spain, with 
Mariana’s texts, and England, with Locke’s proposals. Our purpose is not to be exhaustive, 
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neither on European cases, nor on debates and writings generated by specific situations 
experienced by a couple of countries; it is, rather, to assess to what extent such contexts 
were analysed by distinct authors on their specific theoretical grounds, giving place to 
possibly similar proposals. What is especially interesting is the articulation these authors 
established between false money forms. We will see that the formerly distinct problems, 
namely, on one side, clipping and counterfeiting (mainly by individuals), and, on the other 
side, debasement and enhancement (by princes) were intimately related. One important 
lesson that surges from this insight is that monetary thinkers in the context of metallic 
system were less interested in the money quantity problem than in its very quality, and that 
the quantity issues were subordinated to the quality ones.  
4.1. Jean Bodin and the French monetary crisis of the 1560s and 1570s 
In France, a series of enhancements occurred between 1560 and 1577, a period 
characterised by a dramatic rise in prices. Successive cry-ups did not manage to stop the 
dynamics of rising voluntary prices for the main gold coin, the écu, fostered by the outflow 
of good coins and the inflow of bad foreign coins. The legal price of the gold écu rose from 
46 sols in 1560 to 70 sols in 157713. The deepening crisis was eventually stopped by an 
important reform implemented that year, especially formalized by Thomas Turquam and 
implemented by the Cour des monnaies (Parsons, 2003a). It unified the currency and the unit 
of account, putting the gold écu in the centre of the monetary system at a fixed price of 60 
sols. This new system lasted 25 years.  
In 1566, Jehan Cherruyt de Malestroit, officer of the Chambre des comptes, published 
his analysis of the general rise in prices that was provoking a growing general 
dissatisfaction. Malestroit combined two paradoxes. First, the general perception of prices 
rising sharply was nothing more than an “image of account”, i.e. a monetary illusion caused 
by enhancements. Prices rose indeed along with cry-ups, which meant that anyone did not 
pay things with more metal than before. Second, a rise in the price of the coin 
impoverished people whose incomes were fixed, since they received less metal.  
The controversy that arose in 1568 with the first answer from Jean Bodin (1530-
1596), a jurist and lawyer of relatively low status, is commonly viewed as a pioneering 
moment in the quantity theory of money. Actually, the debate developed throughout the 
1560s and 1570s and various secondary authors participated (at least the following: on an 
independent basis, La Tourrette, Colas, Turquam; supporting Bodin’s position, Girard du 
Haillan; supporting Malestroit’s position, Garrault). Bodin discussed only the first paradox 
of Malestroit, particularly analysing the causes of the rise in prices. Two of those causes 
were monetary: (1) the abundance of gold and silver, and (2) the price of the coin. While 
the second one is the argument developed by Malestroit himself, the first argument is a 
                                                            
13 The French unit of account, the livre tournois, consisted of 20 sols.  
 19 
new one. Today’s economists frequently acknowledge Bodin (1568, 1578, 1593) as one of 
the first authors clearly exposing what would become the quantity theory (O’Brien, 2000), 
but there is no consensus on that point (Arestis, 2002; Blanc, 2007). Anyway, Bodin’s 
monetary ideas should not be reduced to such a theory, at least because the very core of 
Bodin’s monetary analysis has to be found in his reflection on the conditions wherein 
monetary sovereignty should be fulfilled and limited (Blanc, 2006, 2007).  
Such an analysis suggests, thus, that the controversy calls for other interpretations, 
where false money issues are given a central role. Whereas Malestroit centred his analysis 
on enhancement, Bodin not only included both enhancement and debasement by the 
Prince, but also degradation operated by officers of the Mint, counterfeiting and clipping 
by individuals and foreign specie of bad quality.  
Clarifying the common view on false money by showing its underlying logic allows 
one to better understand the debates of the time. For example, it allows one to understand 
that the controversial debate on the royal ability to debase the currency can be hidden by a 
general and unanimous denunciation of bad coins applied to the special cases of 
counterfeiting and bad foreign coins, thus formally lessening the sovereign’s 
responsibility.14 Moreover, some stress the necessity of battling against counterfeiting, 
arguing that it is an impediment to the supremacy of royal minting. The suspicion towards 
coins was nourished by the thin boundaries existing between true and counterfeit coins, on 
one hand, and, on the other hand, good and degraded or debased coins. All these concerns 
finally relate to a dichotomy between good and bad currency. 
These general debates found expression in proposals. In most cases, however, they 
were related to the false money issue only partially, proposing a combination of some of 
the following: severe sanctions against counterfeiters; a change in minting techniques, 
making counterfeiting more difficult; a change in the definition of the metallic content of 
the coins; or a strict prohibition of the use of foreign coins. Nevertheless, the issue of the 
royal ability to debase remained a very difficult one; Jean Bodin tried to resolve it. His 
proposals were intended to definitively avoid all forms of false money. We suggest that 
herein lies the real importance of Bodin in the history of monetary ideas.   
The originality of Bodin’s monetary analysis lies in its relationship with the core 
concept of his works, sovereignty, developed in his major work Les Six Livres de la 
République. Given Bodin’s interest in the development of this concept, counterfeiting by 
individuals should be a much more serious issue than bad coins induced by the Prince’s 
debasement, since counterfeiting usurps the mark of the sovereign and constitutes what 
Bodin called a crime of lèse-majesté. Arguably, bad currency makes it difficult to get stable 
                                                            
14 See for example Bouteroue (1666: 7-9). He defines counterfeiters as those who clip, wash and use other 
inventions in order to debase coins; but the main causes of debasement that he identifies later all proceed 
from the king’s practices.  
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references in prices, which undermines commercial activity. Nevertheless, it is by no means 
in contradiction with sovereignty, since sovereignty implies a right to debase. On the same 
ground, the recurrent circulation of foreign coins (of good and bad quality) should be 
viewed as necessarily hurting the principle of sovereignty.  
Yet, Bodin’s analysis of money puts falsification first, in the broad sense we 
previously identified: he focused his attention on the quality of metal, not on the mark of 
the sovereign. Indeed, the very existence of both counterfeit coins and debased coins 
proceeded from the same logic: profit, resulting from the difference between the legal 
value of the coins and the minting costs. Counterfeiters certainly diverted the mark of the 
sovereign, but their only purpose was to make a profit by falsifying the metallic content of 
the coins they minted. Fighting the falsification of the sovereign’s mark (on the counterfeit 
coins) was thus subordinated to the fight against the falsification of metal (on debased and 
degraded coins). The reversal of Bodin’s analytical framework, putting the principle of 
sovereignty second when reasoning on money, applied too to the problem of foreign 
coins. Bodin worried about this problem when their metallic content was of a lower 
fineness than that of the domestic coins: those bad coins could flow in to be exchanged for 
good French ones, which would be melted and exported. Good foreign coins did not 
create such a problem (Bodin, 1568: 134 and 137-8). Despite his theory of sovereignty, 
Bodin was more troubled by this risk of an inflow of bad coins than by the symbolic 
contradiction brought by foreign currencies to the royal mark. Other French writers after 
him would be more worried by this symbolic issue — for example Montchrétien (1889 
[1615]). Finally, Bodin, like other contemporary monetary writers, with the exception of 
Turquam (1573), did not analyse the effect of the high prices of foreign coins on the price 
of the domestic coin.  
The contradiction between Bodin’s interest in the construction of sovereignty and 
the acceptance of something apparently challenging monetary sovereignty may be 
understood through the distinction between minting and circulation, regarding monetary 
matters. From a minting point of view, the authenticity of the mark is a peremptory 
necessity, the quality of the metal being a secondary issue. From a circulation point of 
view, Bodin reversed this order: the mark is nothing more than secondary, and the metal 
becomes the central point, the conditions in which economic activity is carried out being 
related to it. Consequently, it appears that the false money issue leads to a particular 
combination between, first, the three components of coins (metal, mark and legal value) 
and, second, the two phases of coins (minting and circulation). A strict sovereignty point 
of view would lead to bring up the issue of the mint and the mark, whereas an economic 
point of view would lead to bring up the issue of the metal, the legal value and the 
circulation. It is noticeable that Bodin constructed a theory of sovereignty with a monetary 
dimension but, in order to resolve the false money issue, deeply related to sovereignty, he 
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took up the economic point of view and then stressed the circulation, legal value and metal 
issues.  
The core problem was then, according to Bodin, the design of a sound and stable 
system that definitively prevented debasement by the Prince. Suppressing the features of 
the official monetary system which made the use of metal of low fineness possible would 
be the ground on which it would be possible to completely overcome the crime of lèse-
majesté stemming from counterfeiting, as well as debasement and enhancement by the 
Prince and all forms of degradation.  
Bodin’s proposals led to a monetary system made up of good coins only, whatever 
their origin. He proposed a system organised with full-bodied coins (of gold, of silver and, 
depending on the version of the proposal, of copper) and an immutable legal value of the 
coins equal to their intrinsic value (Bodin, 1593, book VI, chapter 3). He proposed to 
demonetize foreign coins of lower quality and to prohibit the export of good coins. He 
also proposed reforms in minting rules and techniques, so that counterfeiting would 
become technically impossible or too difficult. This last point was not specific to Bodin, 
since other writers or officers of the Mint were also looking for such results15. The French 
monetary reform of 1577 did not take Bodin’s proposals into account. One of its 
weaknesses lied in the idea of a fixed ratio between gold and silver (1:12), as noted by 
O’Brien (2000): it is enough to destroy all the system. Indeed, changes in the current ratio 
due, for instance, to the inflow of more silver than gold as it appeared before and after 
Bodin’s writings, leading to a change in the ratio in favour of gold, would induce flows of 
coins consistent with Gresham’s law.  
4.2. Juan de Mariana and the early beginnings of the ve l lón crisis 
In 1609, the Spanish Jesuit Juan de Mariana (1536-1624) published a short 
“Treatise on the Alteration of Money”16, which may be assessed as an important milestone 
in the evolution of monetary ideas. It must be said that Mariana’s reputation, both 
contemporary and posthumous, came primarily from other books, the Historiæ de Rebus 
Hispaniæ (History of Spain, 1592) and De Rege et Regis Institutione (On the King and the Institution 
of Kingship, 1599). In the latter, which was to serve as a guide for the young Philip III, he 
developed his view of a constitutionalist monarchy. He came to argue that tyrannicide is 
fair when there is no other solution to put an end to the devastation of an unjust king: “any 
citizen, in the name of the people, has the right to kill the tyrant” (Part I:6). His description 
of the tyrant does not directly refer to possible misuses of money, but includes the idea of 
                                                            
15 This was the case, for example, of Nicolas Briot (1615), during the first two decades of the seventeenth 
century, before he crossed the Channel to offer his services in England. 
16 The original Latin text, entitled De Monetæ Mutatione Disputatio?, is part of a much larger book that contains 
several parts, the Tractatus Septem. An English translation of the only “treatise” was published in 2002 in the 
Journal of Markets and Morality; we use this translation in the quotations of the present paper.  
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ruining his subjects and exhausting them so that he cannot enforce more taxation. In the 
same book, Mariana denounced adulterations of the currency as a form of taxation (Part 
III, chap. 8, “De Moneta”).  
Ten years later, his short essay on money mainly dealt with debasement and, with 
less insistence, enhancement, considering however that they differ little (chapter 11)17. 
Mariana wrote this essay in reaction to the new monetary context of Castile, characterised 
by new issues of pure copper coins, known as vellón. Issue of vellóns with a very low silver 
content started in 1597, then two years later new vellóns could be made of copper only. 
This was the beginning of a long history of small change crises in Castile and recurrent 
debasement, ending only in the 1680s (Font de Villanueva, 2006; Jefferies, 2010). Yet, as 
Jefferies (2010) states, Mariana analysed the situation induced by the new vellón issues in a 
theoretical manner, anticipating crises, rather than reacting to situations of open crisis, 
given that such a crisis developed progressively. Vellón crises occurred especially around 
1628 and 1642 with a maelstrom of manipulation of the coin. Although not formulating it 
so directly, Mariana’s central point was then falsification by princes themselves. 
Counterfeiting was considered a sub-product of princes’ falsification, for the disconnection 
between the legal value of the coin and the value of its metallic content made it possible 
for individuals to forge coins of a lesser quality and return a profit on them.  
Mariana stated that a king, not owning his subjects’ goods but protecting them 
unless he is a tyrant, could not create new taxes or raise existing taxes without their free 
consent through a consensus. Debasing money without the consent of subjects, ie reducing 
its intrinsic value through its weight or its quality, as well as enhancing its value, is then 
robbery and an “evil”. According to Mariana, only “pressing circumstances” such as war or 
siege may legitimise debasement without the people’s consent; but should be reverted as 
soon as peace has been restored. Money, as well as weights and measures, is at the very 
foundation of commerce; “they cannot be changed without danger and harm to 
commerce”. What is interesting is that Mariana’s arguments against debasement and 
enhancement were less moral than economic – even though morals were an important part 
of his general reflection, as a theologian who referred to natural law.  
According to Mariana, money has “a twofold value” (chapter 4). One is “intrinsic 
and natural”; it comes from its metallic content (“its type of metal and its weight”, plus 
“the cost of labor and equipment in minting”, ie a brassage including a provision for 
depreciation). The other is “the legal value”, it is “extrinsic, inasmuch as it is established by 
                                                            
17 The original Latin title was more explicit than its English translation: dealing with monetae mutatione, it 
referred to general changes in the currency, i.e. both enhancement and debasement. The variety of the Latin 
words originally employed by Mariana, “mutatione” (a change, that is not necessarily bad), “vitio” (corrupt, 
alter) and “depravatio” (corruption, alteration) are not systematically rendered, and the English words 
“debasement” and “alteration” used in the translation may refer to any of them.  
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the law of the prince, who has the right to prescribe the worth of money as well as of other 
goods”. In Mariana’s ideal system (corresponding to a “well-constituted republic”), these 
two values should be equal and not differ: “they must be mutually adjusted if we want 
things to be sound” (chapter 11). He includes in this reflection the possibility of a small 
seigniorage raising the value of the coin slightly higher than its “intrinsic and natural 
value”. This makes a difference with Bodin’s ideal, where no seigniorage and no brassage 
should be added to the intrinsic value.  
Mariana was primarily concerned by debasement of small change. He starts by 
detailing the advantages resulting from such debasement, beyond the ability to finance the 
king’s expenses (chapter 7). The main advantage of debasement is its capacity to speed 
recovery of the economy when it is ordered in a situation of currency shortage. He then 
discusses, and refutes, several minor disadvantages derived from debasement (chapter 9), 
and states that a pure copper coinage could be good, since its legal value is adjusted to its 
intrinsic one. The major disadvantages are then explained (chapter 10), in the Castilian case 
where more issues were ordered than authorised by law. Firstly, debasement and 
enhancement are “against right reason and the natural law herself – it is a sin to change 
them”. Secondly, this money change generated a general inflation. Mariana firmly states 
that inflation is an inescapable consequence of any alteration in coinage, since the price of 
commodities increases “to the degree that the coins have been debased or the value of the 
coins increased”. Thirdly, debasement generates trade difficulties; yet trade is the 
“foundation for public and private wealth”. All this generates unintended disastrous 
consequences: whereas the king aimed at raising his wealth, he only gets more poverty, far 
from the initial purpose; and, ultimately, the greatest disadvantage is “the general hatred 
that will be stirred up for the prince”.  
It is clear, then, that debasement and enhancement of small change (copper 
vellóns) has to be avoided, for economic and moral reasons. Mariana then discusses the 
case of silver and gold money. The disadvantages previously analysed are the same for 
these coins, but their overall effect depended on the extent of the use of these coins. Since 
“silver is the backbone of commerce”, the effects of silver debasement and enhancement 
would be far-reaching: “when it is altered, everything else resting upon it will necessarily 
collapse” (chapter 11). Mariana shows the turmoil that the mixed circulation of silver coins 
of distinct intrinsic values would produce. On the contrary, the falsification of gold coinage 
would produce little effect because gold was used far less often.  
Mariana thus concludes that “If such is done, without consulting the people, it is 
unjust; if done with their consent, it is in many ways fatal” (chapter 13). Mariana’s treatise 
ends with a bitter attack against corruption. As a consequence of his strong positions, he 
was condemned for the charge of lèse-majesté. He was sentenced to imprisonment and 
was finally confined for years to a Franciscan convent. The Spanish crown intended to 
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destroy the entire edition of the book throughout Europe (Jefferies, 2010, quoting Beltrán, 
1987). The essay, joined to another treatise simultaneously published in the same book, 
was placed on the Index Expurgatorius; some years before, his De Rege had been listed on 
the Inquisition’s Index – to which he had collaborated ten years earlier.  
4.3. John Locke and the great recoinage  
Locke’s major works upon the theory and practice of the political power (his 
Treatises of Government) were written prior to the Glorious Revolution (Laslett, 1970; 
Ashcraft, 1986). Theorizing sovereignty and defining the limits of powers, these treatises 
greatly influenced the new English regime. According to Locke, communities are created 
by an “agreement”, and the government established by “Politick Bodies” should never be 
arbitrary. Arbitrary decisions, or “incroachments […] prejudice or hinder the publick 
good” (Locke, 1689, §163:394). In his Second Treatise of Government, the philosopher clearly 
stated that “the Legislative being only a Fiduciary Power to act for certain ends, there 
remains still in the People a Supream Power to remove or alter the Legislative, when they find the 
Legislative act contrary to the trust reposed in them.” (Locke, 1689, §149:385). Locke’s 
subsequent influential advices on monetary policy (1691 and 1695) must be seen in 
conjunction with the political architecture he had designed. In both cases, the role of trust 
is of paramount importance: for the philosopher, political and monetary trusteeships were 
closely articulated. But, during the Glorious Revolution, the “fiduciary power” of the 
English currency fell at a very low level, and trust in monetary instruments vanished almost 
completely. Indeed, while the war opposing Great Britain with France was prolonged after 
1689, a severe monetary crisis burst (the war broke out after James II had to flee to France 
and was replaced by William of Orange).  
During the 1690s, the scale of the clipping exerted on hammered coins increased 
extremely quickly: the discrepancy between the legal weight of the coins received in 
payment for taxes and their real weight went from 12 % in 1686 to 24 % in 1693, then to 
55 % in 1696 (Kelly, 1991)! The ordinary silver coin was found to contain one half the 
weight of silver it was supposed to contain. This increasing zeal of falsifiers was a major 
indication of a deterioration of faith in the English payment system. A debate took place: a 
Treasury official, William Lowndes, wanted to “raise the coin”, i.e., to increase the extrinsic 
value of the silver coinage. Lowndes’ arguments did not convince the opponents18 of what 
consisted in a depreciation of the pound sterling, notably those who sat in the government. 
These latter listened to different advice, and Somers (Lord keeper of the Seal) urged Locke 
to publish a work criticising each point of Lowndes’ proposals and pleading for a general 
recoinage. Locke thought that coins possessed a natural value, which legislators and kings 
had to respect. Locke denied the fact that money was a political creation and insisted “on 
                                                            
18 “His ultimate objective was to clear the way for new war loans”, Kleer (2004:553). 
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the sacrosanctity of the monetary standard”19. Thus its value could not be modified in a 
mindless way, and the public authority had to protect its stability. In any case, the source of 
monetary disorders was to be found in the proliferation of misdeeds.  
According to Locke, an enhancement would assimilate the State to a counterfeiter, 
because it would sell a lesser quantity of metal under the same name. “Raising the coin” 
would “rob all Creditors of One twentieth of their Debts, and all Landlords One twentieth of 
their quit Rents for ever” (Locke, 1691:309)20. Stamping coins, one of the sovereign acts 
par excellence, guaranteed the smooth carrying out of payments, hence the King could not 
manipulate the standard at will. The strength of this position which “naturalised” money 
laid in its capacity to transcend the opposition between Whigs and Tories and to reconcile 
the point of view of the creditors and the land-owners. On the other hand, debtors and the 
lower classes were intended to pay the price of the reform promoted by Locke, their debts 
being revalued. “[T]he use and end of the public stamp is only to be a guard and voucher 
of the quantity of silver which men contract for; and the injury done to the public faith, in 
this point, is that which in clipping and false coining heightens the robbery into treason” 
(Locke, 1695:415). The counterfeiters’ search for profit not only constituted a theft21, but a 
case of high treason. “For what was at stake was not simply an economic proposition, but 
social subversion” (Caffentzis, 1989:35). The monetary crime exceeded widely the scope of 
the traffic of precious metals: it affected the very foundations of civil society. “Clipping is 
the great Leak which for some time past has contributed more to Sink us than all the Force 
of our Enemies could do. ‘Tis like a Breach in the Sea-bank, which widens every moment 
till it be stop’d.” (Locke, 1695:472) 
The philosopher reasoned both in terms of the ethical and routine levels of trust in 
money: clippers undermined the social contract because they attacked the representation of 
the State, while the King should avoid every alteration. As Locke asserted, monetary policy 
must strengthen faith because “Altering the Standard [...] will weaken, if not totally destroy 
the publick Faith” (Locke, 1695:417). So the authorities should insure that the circulating 
medium was perfectly fitted to the standard: it was thus wise to practise a general 
recoinage, even at the price of deflation. To summarize, « The clippers were more serious 
enemies of the state, in Locke’s view, than the French regiments at Namur» (Caffentzis, 
1989:43). Assimilating mere clipping to a crime of high treason towards the Commonwealth 
ensured the monopoly of the state by effectively punishing such a crime by capital 
punishment. 
                                                            
19 See Appleby (1978: 64) and Kelly (1991: 29). 
20 « Creditors and Landlords: the classes to which Locke himself belonged, and whose interest, particularly that 
of the landlords, he tended to equate with that of the state. », Kelly (1991, vol. II: 443). See H. Layton, 
Observations concerning Money and Coin, 1697, p.13, cited par Appleby (1978: 58). 
21 “Clipping by English Men is robbing the honest Man”, Locke (1695: 417). 
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Eventually, William III, concerned with the restoration of the honour and the 
prestige of the nation, supported Locke’s conclusions. Under his impulse, Recoinage Acts 
were promulgated. Hammered, clipped and false silver coins were to be melted and 
recoined (milled)22. After May 4 1696, clipped coins were no longer legal means of 
payment. In 1696 and 1697, counterfeiters constituted the daily concern of the 
government. The pursuit of offenders had to be carried out effectively. This task fell to the 
Mint. In 1696, Isaac Newton was appointed Director of the Mint, of which possessed 
judiciary powers. From the time of his arrival, he had to pilot the modalities of the 
recoinage, that was, the organisation in the entire English territory of the reception then 
the reintroduction of coins. Two Acts preventing counterfeiting were passed in 1696 and 
1697 by which the prosecution of the cheater was expanded, so any proven appropriation 
of the privilege to mint coins really exposed perpetrators to capital punishment. 
Abandoning his scientific research, Newton set himself the task of fighting counterfeiters 
with unequalled zeal. He personally collected information concerning suspects and pursued 
them, which led to the execution of many offenders23. “Newton became the detector, 
interrogator and prosecutor of the actual miscreants, helping fill Newgate and providing 
much employment for the hangman at Tyburn.” (Caffentzis, 1989:19) Those who 
tampered with the symbols of sovereignty were sentenced to capital punishment24 and 
publicly executed. The severity of the punishment indicates that the offences perceived 
before the crisis in an almost indulgent way were no longer tolerated. The officers of the 
“monetary police”25 displayed a lot of energy. In 1699, Newton became Warden of the 
Mint.   
Under Locke’s (and Newton’s) authority, rules promulgated in correspondence to 
these ethics were respected, which consequently conserved the integrity of the coins. 
Through the circulation of the new coins which had the inscription “Decus and Tutamen” 
(Glory and Defence) on their edge, the routine dimension of public faith was restored. This 
reform prevented endless discussions about the quality of coins during transactions. The 
payment system appeared to be preserved. The expansion of English finance doubtless 
required such a supervision of the procedures of coinage necessary for a reliable delivery of 
the coins. To take Locke’s expression, England’s “Fiduciary Power” had beeen 
                                                            
22 “And so for the first time since the great recoinage of the pollards in the year 1299, a recoinage was 
effected which restored entirely the standard that had existed before the debasement”, Feaveryear (1931: 
135). 
23 “During Newton’s first three years at the mint, he imprisoned more than one hundred suspected clippers 
and counterfeiters. In his first full year, there were at least fifteen executions at Tyburn for coinage crimes in 
London alone […]”, Wennerlind (2004: 147). See also Craig (1963). 
24 “In the case of forgery, the more exemplary punishment called for in the statute was the gallows. [...] it 
represented the most solemn spectacle in the armoury of justice. It addressed the entire community.”, Mc 
Gowen (1999: 135). 
25 See Linebaugh (1991: 56). 
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strengthened. Having said that, the repressive policy completed the new monetary system 
more than founded it. Succeeding the reform, pressure aimed at supporting trust and not 
at decreeing it arbitrarily. In France, for example, during the assignats experiment 
(banknotes used during the French Revolution), the threat of the guillotine in case of 
refusal of notes aimed at forcing the acceptance of that instrument, but unsuccessfully. 
5. Toward a monetary revolution 
From the Middle Ages to the early modern period, minting was the first 
manufacturing industry to be gathered in the hands of princes. The scarcity of coins, poor 
technical devices, prince’s manipulation and the tolerance in society paved the way for a 
steady degradation of the circulating medium This general context constituted the 
background for Bodin, Mariana and Locke’s proposals. Whatever their scientific relevance, 
their concrete feasibility or their historical fortune, they announced what has been 
sometimes considered as the monetary revolution of the 18th century.  
5.1. Counteracting falsification: convergence between the three authors 
In the context of specific countries that shared the same metallic monetary system 
current throughout Europe, Jean Bodin, Juan de Mariana, and John Locke, were three 
major thinkers who devoted an impressive number of pages to monetary troubles relating 
to falsification (broadly conceived). Beyond their divergences, which may be explained by 
distinct moral, social and political positions as well as distinct periods and countries, the 
three “Johns” featured several common ideas.  
An important part of their analytical work was centred on sovereignty and 
commonwealth. But, whereas Bodin legitimated the principle of absolute sovereignty, 
stating that the prince himself does not have to show obedience to his laws, Mariana and 
Locke developed a constitutionalist view in which such a principle was clearly refused, the 
prince having to show, like his subjects, obedience to the laws. This induced a distinct 
position on the moral consequences of debasement or enhancement: this was clearly 
robbery for Mariana and Locke (Mariana considering it an evil, if not consented by 
people), while Bodin avoided such a term. However, Bodin stated that the value and the 
content of the currency were not a matter of law but of a contract between the sovereign 
and his subjects, thus setting up practical limits to the principle of absolute sovereignty in 
the specific field of money26. Bodin proved to be not so far from Mariana’s position on 
monetary sovereignty, while Locke’s doctrine consisted in extracting money from the 
                                                            
26 In this domain, his positions were close to Oresme’s writings: in the Treatise of Money (1355), Oresme 
explained that the prince should act for the « common good » : « in order to prevent fraud… the money… 
should be made by a public person… And since the Prince is a more public person, and of a higher authority, 
it is convenient that, for the community, he should have money made. » (Oresme 1355, chapter 5), see 
Lapidus, 1997. 
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royal’s scope, thus leaving no latitude to the prince. Bodin and Locke considered princes 
manipulating the currency as falsifiers, and Bodin and Mariana recalled the story of that 
king Philippe IV the Fair - although Mariana avoided considering the prince’s manipulation 
as falsification.  
Beyond these differences, a common concern about the ability to debase the 
currency led them to strongly affirm the necessity, for economic stability as well as for 
public faith and, therefore, civil peace, of a metallic system able to prevent any form of 
false money, be they operated by individuals or princes. There is then clearly a 
subordination of falsification by individuals to falsification by princes and their 
administration; indeed, suppressing the former requires first to suppress the latter. But, 
whereas it was politically very easy and common to denounce counterfeiters and clippers, it 
could be much more risky to denounce present monarchs, their courtiers and advisers as 
well as high officials of the Mint. Mariana learnt this to his cost, experiencing jail, then 
confinement. Bodin, who once gained the King’s confidence, finally lost it after having 
freely exposed brave positions on money and finance. Locke, on the contrary, succeeded in 
gaining and keeping high official position in the Glorious Revolution’s new regime.  
Bodin, Mariana and Locke were metallists, whose priority was the necessity of 
building a stable and pure metallic monetary system which was falsification proof. This 
leads to put secondary the quantity problem (although all three, to various degrees, went to 
discuss the link between prices and money quantity) and subordinate it to the problem of 
metallic quality of money. But whereas Locke conceived money as pure metal by essence, 
being a “theoretical metallist” under Schumpeter’s definition (Schumpeter, 1954: 288), 
Bodin and Mariana were rather “practical metallists”, since they viewed the implementation 
of a full-bodied coins system as the way to reach monetary stability, but not as the very 
essence of money: they saw money as primarily the creature of the sovereign.  
Disregarding specific divergences, all three aimed at establishing a system of coins 
of pure metal (gold, silver, and, quite debated, copper), whose legal value would have to be 
adjusted to its intrinsic value (with debate on brassage and seigniorage). This would 
correspond to what Mariana called a “well-constituted republic”. Related to those 
monetary reflections, the three authors went on to analyse the ways the royal expenses 
could and should be covered, since the monetary expedient would disappear. They shared 
a similar position too: finding moral limits to expenses, and analysing, from both an 
economic and moral viewpoint, advantages and disadvantages of different means to levy 
funds.  
5.2. Stabilization as a “monetary revolution” 
The sequence of works starting with Bodin, continuing with Mariana and ending 
with Locke extended over nearly 130 years. At the end of this long period, a “monetary 
revolution” took place. Whereas Bodin and Mariana’s proposals were confined to the 
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sphere of ideas (despite their own wills), Locke’s arguments against debasement 
constituted a landmark for the English monetary history.  
In their works, falsification by princes (enhancement and debasement) had to be 
definitively rejected, and the improvement of minting processes was a way to eliminate 
individual falsification. Debased and enhanced currencies were opposed to an ideal 
currency whose legal value depended only on the metallic content. The stabilization of the 
currency and the standardisation of specie were the two faces of the same coin, i.e. the 
setting of a stable monetary medium. This entire process articulated routine, hierarchical 
and ethical faith (respectively, confidence, credibility and trust). First, the royal arbitrary, 
allowing princes to abuse their privileges on money, had to be abolished; morals and the 
growing awareness of the need for economic stability contributed to this dramatic change. 
Thus, rejecting the secular habit of continual falsification through debasement and 
enhancement, sovereigns would consolidate their legitimacy. In its ethical dimension, trust 
in money appears clearly as a corollary of hierarchical credibility of the State administrators 
of the political body. As regards credibility, the control over coinage, contested by the 
counterfeiters, had to be re-appropriated. In the same movement, sanctions against 
clippers and private money-makers should strengthen the confidence through making 
routine uses of money more safety.  
The stabilization of the currency with respect to the system of account, and the 
refusal of princes’ debasement and enhancement, constituted major economic and political 
issues. Indeed, the growing use of private claims in the sphere of payments and the 
lengthening of credit terms required reassuring creditors as to the convertibility of their 
monetary and financial instruments. “With the growth of private credit, in which the rise 
of capitalism had its origins, mistrust of the money of account hindered the productive 
utilisation of savings. [...] The monetary revolution preceded the industrial revolution by a 
good half-century. [...] the most important factor was the institution of a system in which a 
(private) bank issued a currency, trust in which was maintained by convertibility into a high 
quality metal currency constituting a monetary base which was itself linked to the unit of 
account via a ratio decreed by the sovereign.” (Aglietta, 2002:41-42) Thus, the rejection of 
further monetary depreciation in England in 1695, the French stabilization in 1726, the 
Spanish “stability” at the same period and other European cases27, were not mere 
accidents: those long term moves were required to let the credit develop. As long as a 
doubt subsisted on the means of payment someone received for his claim, capitalist 
lending processes were confined to a small part of society (involved principally in 
international exchanges) and estates were the best means to secure wealth. Only a solid 
                                                            
27 After the reform of 1726 (led by cardinal Fleury), the French king promised to avoid further debasements 
(see Tabatoni, 1999). E.J. Hamilton called the beginning of the 18th century in Spain, the time of “stability”. 
For a general overview of Europe at that time, see Tucci, 1984. 
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degree of confidence in the money-object permitted financial developments, and 
eventually, industrialization28. In the same manner Luddites, who offended the means of 
production, were combated in order to protect capital in the 19th century, monetary 
falsifiers in a broad sense, be they private or public, were rejected during the 18th century.  
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